基于主从博弈的虚拟电厂内部购售电价格制定方法

Method for determining the internal price of virtual power plant based on stackelberg game theory

中文关键词: 虚拟电厂  产消者  主从博弈  内部购售电价  现货市场

英文关键词: virtual power plant  prosumer  stackelberg game  internal market price  spot market

中文摘要:

      随着用户侧分布式电源的广泛接入，虚拟电厂可聚合的资源逐渐向产消者过渡。传统的虚拟电厂聚合用户侧资源主要有2种策略：一是直接控制负荷,二是通过负荷预测进而单方面制定电价引导用户调整用能需求。然而前者无法尊重用户的用能偏好，后者由于用户行为无法准确预测，虚拟电厂单方面发布的价格信号无法准确引导用户行为，且上述策略未考虑用户作为产消者的发电能力。针对上述问题建立了虚拟电厂与内部产消者的主从博弈模型，综合考虑双方的效益，制定虚拟电厂运营商向内部产消者的购售电价格，通过电价信号引导产消者调整发用电策略，最终形成虚拟电厂的对外出力。算例分析表明，通过所提出的模型，虚拟电厂和内部产消者均可获得可观收益，同时算例也表明现货市场价格的变化对虚拟电厂内部市场电价的制定存在巨大影响。

英文摘要:

      With the extensive access of user-side distributed power generation, the resources that can be aggregated in virtual power plants are gradually transiting to prosumers. There are two main strategies for traditional virtual power plants to aggregate user-side resources：One is direct load control, the other one is to guide users to adjust their energy demand through load forecasting and then unilaterally setting the price of electricity. However, the first one cannot respect the user’s energy preference, while the second one cannot accurately predict the user behavior, so the price signal cannot accurately guide the user behavior. Moreover, the above strategies don’t consider the user’s power generation capacity. Aiming at the above problems, a stackelberg game model between the two sides is established, to set the purchase and sale prices inside the virtual power plant, guiding prosumers to adjust the power generation and consumption strategies, and finally the external output of virtual power plant is formed. The case analysis shows that both the virtual power plant and the internal producers and consumers can get considerable benefits through the model proposed. The case also shows that the change of the price of the spot market has a great influence on the determination of the internal market electricity price of the virtual power plant.