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不同能源结构及输电容量下发电商策略对省级现货市场需求侧价格的影响分析 |
Analysis of the Impact of Generator Strategies on Demand-side Prices in Provincial Spot Markets under Dif-ferent Energy Structures and Transmission Capacities |
投稿时间:2025-05-06 修订日期:2025-06-22 |
DOI: |
中文关键词: 发电商策略 需求侧价格 能源结构 输电容量 社会福利 |
英文关键词: generator strategy demand-side price energy structure transmission capacity social welfare |
基金项目:江苏省省公司科技项目 |
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中文摘要: |
随着电力市场改革的不断推进,发电商的策略行为成为研究的热点,尤其是发电商的策略行为对市场需求侧价格的影响。基于江苏省的简化网架结构,探讨了能源结构和输电容量变化对省级现货市场中发电商合谋集团策略、需求侧价格、市场竞价行为及社会福利的影响。通过构建四个算例(Case 1至Case 4),分析了不同能源结构和输电容量条件下,发电商的策略选择、市场表现和需求侧价格波动现 。在能源结构方面,发电商市场份额分布不均时,合谋行为显著抬高需求侧价格,导致负荷需求减少,增加消费者电力负担。输电容量的限制则在系统阻塞情况下加剧了合谋行为,发电商利用阻塞线路抬高LMP,进一步提高收益并抬高市场价格。社会福利分析表明,存在合谋行为的情况下,市场福利显著低于完全竞争状态,特别是当系统发生阻塞时,福利进一步下降。结果表明,能源结构和输电容量变化都会显著影响发电商的定价策略及市场效率,政策制定者应在电网建设和能源转型过程中,采取有效措施,以避免发电商策略行为对需求侧价格的负面影响,从而提升市场的整体社会福利。 |
英文摘要: |
With the continuous advancement of the electricity market reform, the strategic behaviors of power generators have become a research hotspot, especially the impact of the stra-tegic behaviors of power generators on the prices on the de-mand side of the market. Based on the simplified grid struc-ture of Jiangsu Province, the influences of changes in energy structure and transmission capacity on the collusion group strategies of power generators, demand-side prices, market bidding behaviors and social welfare in the provincial spot market were explored. By constructing four examples (Case 1 to Case 4), the strategy choices of power generators, market performance and price fluctuations on the demand side under different energy structures and transmission capacities were analyzed. In terms of the energy structure, when the market share of power generators is unevenly distributed, collusive behavior significantly raises the price on the demand side, resulting in a reduction in load demand and an increase in the electricity burden on consumers. The limitation of transmis-sion capacity intensifies collusive behavior in the case of system congestion. Power generators use blocked lines to raise the LMP, further increasing profits and driving up market prices. Social welfare analysis indicates that in the presence of collusion, market welfare is significantly lower than that in a perfectly competitive state, especially when the system is blocked, welfare further declines. The results show that changes in energy structure and transmission capacity will significantly affect the pricing strategies and market effi-ciency of power generators. Policy makers should take effec-tive measures during the process of power grid construction and energy transition to avoid the negative impact of power generator strategic behaviors on demand-side prices, thereby enhancing the overall social welfare of the market. |
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